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Age-related decline in Theory of Mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which 3 
is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about others’ mental states. We assessed 4 
how older (OA; n=50) versus younger adults (YA; n=50) were affected by three theoretically 5 
relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued 6 
locations and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related 7 
difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when 8 
representing a belief incongruent with one’s own. Individual differences in attention and 9 
motor response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through conflicting 10 
Self-Other perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by managing 11 
conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for 12 
predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that 13 
previous studies may have underestimated OA’s ToM proficiency by including unnecessary 14 
conflict in ToM tasks. 15 
 16 
Statement of Relevance 17 
We use our ability to interpret what other people think on a daily basis. Termed ‘Theory of 18 
Mind’ (ToM), this is an essential facilitator of social interaction. Previous studies suggest 19 
that ToM proficiency declines in later life, which is associated with poorer psychological 20 
wellbeing. However, these earlier studies often confounded changes in ToM with broader 21 
age-related changes in ‘executive functions’ (EF) like attention, memory and inhibitory 22 
control. There is general consensus that these EFs decline with age, but this is less clear for 23 
ToM, due to how ToM and EF interact. This research examined the link between ToM and EF 24 
to disentangle the effects of declining EF from any age-related changes in ToM. We show 25 
how prior studies may overestimate the decline of ToM in healthy ageing, because of 26 
experimental demands which are not essential for a functioning ToM. This information 27 
could inform support for older adults' psychological functioning. 28 
 29 
 30 




Open Practices Statement 1 
This study was formally preregistered following an Open Science Framework protocol, which 2 
is available from https://osf.io/dc8ce. The novel ToM task, de-identified data and a 3 
supporting code-book are freely available from https://osf.io/9zmx8/.  4 
  5 




1. Introduction 1 
Previous studies of normal ageing and ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM), the ability to infer another 2 
person’s thoughts, beliefs and desires, have produced contradictory findings regarding 3 
whether ToM competence declines in older adulthood (Henry et al., 2013; Love, 2015; 4 
Phillips et al., 2011). Methodological limitations, however, through some tasks making 5 
excess demands on executive function (EF), may explain this disparity (Love, 2015): EF 6 
typically deteriorates with healthy ageing (Salthouse, 2010; 2012), but there is also evidence 7 
that cognitive conflict is embedded within representing other peoples’ cognitive 8 
perspectives (Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004), making 9 
understanding age-related differences in ToM proficiency difficult.  10 
EF is important for an operational ToM (Austin, Groppe & Elsner, 2014; Vetter et al., 11 
2013). ToM often involves reasoning about others’ beliefs that may differ from our own. 12 
Sometimes there is more than one other person and our own knowledge of the right answer 13 
may vary in certainty. These factors are often confounded in the classic ToM literature. 14 
Working memory, attention and inhibition have been suggested to support mental state 15 
representation through managing conflict (Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Leslie, Friedman, 16 
& German, 2004). Such conflict could arise from competing cued information, where 17 
attentional resources must be disengaged from one information source to select another – a 18 
typical feature of false belief (FB) paradigms which are used to assess ToM. Likewise, 19 
knowledge of an event’s outcome may also interfere with an individual’s ability to reason, 20 
due to bias towards one’s own, salient self-knowledge – termed a ‘curse of knowledge’ or 21 
CofK (Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007). To make predictions based on an agent’s FB, one must 22 
inhibit one’s own perspective of the true state of affairs – I know the object is really in the 23 
box – to adopt the other person’s – they think the object is still in the basket. Indeed, in 24 
healthy adults, false- versus true-belief reasoning is associated with slower, more error-25 
prone behavioural performance (Apperly et al., 2008; Apperly et al., 2011). Manipulation of 26 
core parameters within the FB task demonstrates additional processing associated with 27 
‘self-perspective inhibition’, suggesting that incongruence in Self-Other cognitive 28 
perspectives may create conflict that is distinct from other sources of conflict within ToM 29 
tasks (Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2005; Samson et al., 2015). 30 
It is not, however, clear from the existing literature whether having a privileged 31 
knowledge of reality, or the mismatch in the cognitive perspectives of Self and Other, is the 32 




basis of competition in FB reasoning. Moreover, it is unclear whether the source of 1 
competition may explain conflicting findings in healthy ageing. Mental-state representation 2 
has consistently been shown to recruit different brain systems to non-mental 3 
representation (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006), but those neural systems for 4 
ToM interact with systems for EF (Hartwright et al., 2012; 2013; 2016; Mars et al., 2012).   5 
Dwindling underlying baseline connectivity of brain regions typically associated with ToM – 6 
particularly the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) – only partially predict poorer performance 7 
in OAs (Hughes et al., 2019). Given that prior research shows differentiation between YA 8 
and OA in ToM as a function of EF demands (Bottiroli et al., 2016; German and Hehman, 9 
2006), it is important to better understand whether EF changes impact ToM and how 10 
conflict affects ToM processing more broadly and in ageing. 11 
In this preregistered study (protocol: https://osf.io/dc8ce) we investigated the 12 
association between conflict and ToM in healthy ageing. Throughout, we refer to specific 13 
research questions (RQn) and their corresponding hypotheses (RHn), as required for the 14 
preregistration protocol. First, we aimed to understand which factors are responsible for 15 
variation in the difficulty of reasoning about the beliefs of others (RQ1-4). We hypothesized 16 
that both a participant’s knowledge of reality (RH1) and incongruence between the 17 
participant’s “self-perspective” and an agent’s “other-perspective” (RH2) would contribute 18 
to difficulty. Further, we hypothesised an interaction between these effects (RH3), reflecting 19 
the intuition that our judgements of others’ perspectives may be most difficult when the 20 
other person not only has a different perspective, but we know that it is wrong. These two 21 
aspects are confounded in the classic object transfer FB task, consequently, the present 22 
paradigm aims to disentangle these as candidate sources of conflict. 23 
Second, we set out to clarify the contribution of attentional cueing to performance 24 
costs on FB tasks (RQ4). It has often been noted that giving the correct answer in common 25 
FB paradigms might require participants to shift attention between competing locations, 26 
typically cued by a participant’s representations of where the object is located and where 27 
the other person thinks it is located (see Friedman & Leslie, 2005). This is a typical feature of 28 
many FB paradigms though, unlike differences between Self- and Other-perspectives, it is 29 
not an essential feature of FB problems. In this study, we de-confounded this factor from 30 
effects of knowledge-of-reality in conditions where alternative locations corresponded to 31 
the beliefs of two different agents. We hypothesised that there would be greater cognitive 32 




effort associated with holding in mind competing Self vs Other perspectives versus 1 
managing alternate locations (Other-Other perspectives; RH4). These first aims were 2 
assessed across the entire sample. 3 
Third, studies of ToM in healthy ageing generally suggest reduced ToM capacities in 4 
later life, where OA show impairment in false-, but not true-belief reasoning (Phillips et al., 5 
2011). However, the cognitive basis of this impairment is unclear and confounded due to 6 
methodological limitations of some ToM tasks. By manipulating psychologically relevant 7 
parameters within a single ToM task, we aimed to evaluate which cognitive components of 8 
belief-reasoning could explain age-specific deficits in performance (RQ5-6). We expected 9 
that ageing would be associated with an overall reduction in performance – slower and 10 
more error-prone responses – and that OA would show greater difficulty with self-11 
perspective inhibition, attending and managing conflict from multiple cued locations, and 12 
handling incongruence between beliefs – all aspects that are pertinent to FB representation 13 
(RH5-6). Lastly, we conducted exploratory analyses to further explore the 14 
neuropsychological bases of our results. We used standardised measures of EF alongside 15 
age to predict the magnitude of conflict elicited by our ToM manipulations.  16 
 17 
2. Materials and Methods 18 
For transparency, any deviations from the preregistration are identified within the text of 19 
this manuscript using an S appended by a superscript alphanumeric identifier (e.g., S1a) 20 
which corresponds to a statement in SOM-R Supplement 1. 21 
 22 
2.1 Participants 23 
One hundred and two adults with no self-reported neuro-psychiatric history and normal or 24 
corrected-to-normal vision participated in the study. Two participants’ data were excluded: 25 
one YA due to a methodological issue and one OA for scoring beyond the cut-off point in a 26 
dementia screening measure. Thus, the final sample comprised 100 participantsS1a; 50 YA 27 
(21 male; age range 18-29 years, mean age = 20.2) and 50 OA (18 male; age range 60-79 28 
years, mean age = 67.9). YA were recruited via the university’s research participation 29 
scheme, university noticeboards and email advertisements to staff; OA were recruited from 30 
the university’s research panel, local interest and hobby groups, university noticeboards and 31 
email advertisements to staff. YA were either compensated with course credits or a small 32 




honorarium and all OA received a small honorarium for their participation. The majority of 1 
the OA (57%) were educated to undergraduate degree level or higher. The study was 2 
approved by Aston University’s Life & Health Sciences Ethics Committee. All participants 3 
gave written informed consent prior to participation.  4 
 5 
2.2 Statistical Power 6 
The Power Analysis for General Anova designs tool (PANGEA; Westfall, 2015) was used to 7 
conduct a post-hoc sensitivity analysis. Given our sample size of 50 per group, with 18 8 
replicates per observation in our primary task, we had ~90% power to detect three-way 9 
interactions with a small effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.2). 10 
 11 
2.3 Design 12 
The study design and analysis plan were preregistered; the registration can be found with 13 
the DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/DC8CE. All data and project materials can be found with DOI: 14 
10.17605/OSF.IO/9ZMX8. 15 
 16 
2.3.1 Theory of Mind abilities: False belief task 17 
The current ToM paradigm was based on Apperly et al. (2011) and Hartwright et al. (2012); 18 
it can be downloaded in E-prime format from https://osf.io/9zmx8/ (E-Prime 2.0 software; 19 
Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The current task was non-inferential: 20 
participants are explicitly made aware of others’ belief states. See Supplement 2 for a 21 
discussion on the equivalence of inferential and non-inferential ToM tasks. 22 
The current ToM task consisted of a three-factor (2x2x2) design wherein each factor 23 
manipulated whether a theoretically-based potential source of conflict was high or low 24 
(indicated with a subscript 1 or 0 respectively); see Table 1. The first factor, termed 25 
‘Knowledge of Reality’ (KoR)S1B, varied the presence of the participant’s explicit knowledge 26 
about reality, and was based on prior work suggesting one’s own self-knowledge can cause 27 
interference when representing that of another. The KoR manipulation resulted in a ‘reality 28 
unknown’ (KoR0) and a ‘reality known’ (KoR1) condition. The second factor, termed ‘Other-29 
Other Congruence’ (OOC)S1B, manipulated the congruence of two agents’ perspectives, 30 
resulting in a minimal conflict (congruent) and maximal conflict (incongruent) condition 31 
(OOC0 and OOC1 respectively). The third factor, termed ‘Self-Other Congruence’ (SOC)S1B, 32 




concerned the congruence of the participant’s and the target agent’s perspectives, where 1 
the presence of conflict between those perspectives was manipulated. As with the OOC 2 
condition, this resulted in a minimal (congruent) and maximal (incongruent) conflict 3 
condition (SOC0 and SOC1 respectively). These latter two factors were based on work 4 
suggesting that ToM reasoning is supported by executive selection to resolve competition 5 
between salient cues.  6 
 7 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 8 
 9 
 
Table 1.    
Summary of Experimental Factors and Levels     
 
 factor levels 
Condition Factor descriptor lowa conflict higha conflict 
Knowledge of Reality 
(KoR) 
Manipulates whether the 
participant is given explicit 
knowledge about the true 









congruence of two 
agents’b beliefs about 












congruence of the 
participant's and the 
target agent'sb beliefs 








Note. aThe deemed 'level' of conflict was theoretically driven. bThe agent(s) beliefs can be 
true or false as, unlike the participant, the agents have no knowledge of reality. 
 10 
The three-factor design was formulated into a computer-based task where 11 
participants were required to respond from a target agent’s perspective (ToM trial), or 12 
based on what they, themselves explicitly knew (an anti-strategy trial, herein termed a 13 
‘filler’). Each experimental trial outlined a game where a magician hid a ball in one of three 14 




cups and subsequently shuffled the cups away from view. Participants were required to 1 
indicate either i) where a target agent believed the ball was hidden (ToM trial) or ii) where 2 
the participant themselves thought the ball was (filler trial). Each trial comprised a sequence 3 
where each of the two agents indicated where they thought the ball was hidden, plus a clue 4 
– which the agents were not privy to – regarding what was inside one of the three cups. For 5 
each trial, a response probe was presented which indicated which of the two agents was the 6 
target agent and the nature of the response the participant should give (ToM or filler). The 7 
fillers were developed to confirm that participants were attending to the clue regarding 8 
where the ball really was, by responding with the true location of the ball as this clue 9 
permitted differentiation in beliefs between the participant and the agents. Note that the 10 
fillers can be solved without ToM reasoning and therefore were used only to identify and 11 
exclude participants who were not attending to the task appropriately.  12 
 Each trial comprised five static images, followed with a central fixation mark (see 13 
Figure 1, Panel A).  The first image always depicted a magician shuffling three cups. Three 14 
further images were then presented. The order of presentation of these three images was 15 
counterbalanced using a Latin square and randomised. One image showed the magician’s 16 
hands obscuring the contents of two of the three cups. In the unobscured cup, either a 17 
green ball or an X was shown to indicate the presence (green ball) or absence (green X) of 18 
the ball, respectively. The participant only ever knew the contents of one cup per trial, 19 
consequently, they either knew explicitly the true location of the ball (ball shown), or they 20 
had to infer that it was under one of the two obscured cups (X shown). Two further images 21 
depicted one of the agents in front of one of the three cups, indicating which cup that agent 22 
believed the ball was located in (both agents’ beliefs were indicated in every trial). Following 23 
presentation of the three images, a response probe was shown. This depicted either an 24 
image of one of the two agents, requiring the participant to respond with where that agent 25 
thought the ball was (ToM trials), or an image of a hand with a finger pointed toward the 26 
participant where – based on the earlier clue – the participants had to respond with where 27 
they themselves thought the ball was (filler trials). Participants used number keys 1, 2 and 3 28 
on the number pad of the computer keyboard to indicate their selected cup (left to right, 29 
where cup one was coded as 1 on the number pad). The eight experimental conditions were 30 
created by manipulating whether the participant knew where the ball was (KoR1), or if the 31 
green X was shown, leaving the location unknown (KoR0); whether the two agents’ beliefs 32 




about the location of the ball were congruent (OOCo) or incongruent (OOC1); and whether 1 
the participant’s and target agent’s beliefs about the location of the ball were congruent 2 
(SOC0) or incongruent (SOC1), as outlined in Figure 1, Panel B. By varying KoR, OOC and SOC, 3 
eight conditions were created: KoR0OOC0SOC0; KoR1OOC0SOC0; KoR0OOC1SOC0; 4 
KoR0OOC0SOC1; KoR1OOC1SOC0; KoR1OOC0SOC1; KoR0OOC1SOC1; KoR1OOC1SOC1, where 5 
each condition described the state of affairs in relation to the target agent, as indicated by 6 
the response probe. The study comprised 18 repetitions of each experimental condition for 7 
trials and 9 repetitions of each condition for fillers. This resulted in reaction-time and 8 
accuracy data for 144 trials of interest and 72 fillers. The number of repetitions of each 9 
condition, the location of the ball, and the target agent were counterbalanced across the 10 
experiment. Participants completed four counterbalanced experimental blocks, each 11 
containing 54 trials. Reaction-times were collected based on the time taken to respond 12 
following the onset of the response probe. Accuracy was treated as identifying the correct 13 
cup, as required by the response probe. Omissions were treated as errors. Overall, the ToM 14 
experiment comprised 216 trials, equally split across 4 blocks (54 per block; block duration = 15 
9 mins; each trial = 10 s). Each block comprised 36 ToM trials and 18 fillers.  16 
 17 











Figure 1. Panel A: A single trial outline with event timings. *Order of events varied across 4 
trials. Panel B: Schematic of the three experimental factors and how these were achieved. 5 
KoR = Knowledge of Reality: reality unknown (KoR0), where an X was shown to indicate 6 
absence of the ball from that location; reality known (KoR1), where the ball was shown to 7 
highlight its true location. OOC = Other-Other Congruence: the two agents’ beliefs about the 8 
location of the ball were congruent (OOCo) or incongruent (OOC1) with one another. SOC = 9 
Self-Other Congruence: the target agent’s belief about the location of the ball was 10 
congruent (SOC0) or incongruent (SOC1) with the participant’s belief about the location of 11 
the ball.  12 
 13 
2.3.2 Theory of Mind abilities: – Perspective Taking 14 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) comprises four self-report subscales: 15 
Perspective Taking (PT), Fantasy, Empathic Concern and Personal Distress. Although we 16 
administered the full scale to ensure reliability of the measure, we were primarily interested 17 




in data from the PT subscale as this is said to be indicative of a participant’s (self-reported) 1 
proficiency with taking other people’s cognitive perspectives. This measure did not form 2 
part of any preregistered hypotheses but was used for exploratory analyses. 3 
 4 
2.3.3 Neuropsychological testing 5 
Participants’ EF was evaluated using the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated 6 
Battery (CANTAB Eclipse v6; Cambridge Cognition Ltd). The test battery comprised the 7 
Motor Screening Task (MOT), used to familiarise participants with the CANTAB system; the 8 
Choice Reaction Time (CRT), a simple 2-choice RT measure encompassing uncertainty; the 9 
Stop Signal Task (SST), used to measure response inhibition; the Attention Switching Task 10 
(AST), used to assess attention and cognitive flexibility; and the Spatial Working Memory 11 
(SWM) task, which measures retention and manipulation of visuospatial information. Data 12 
from these tasks did not inform any preregistered hypotheses but were collected for 13 
exploratory analyses and to describe the sample characteristics. 14 
 15 
2.3.4 Screening 16 
All participants were administered the Autism Quotient (AQ-10; Allison, Auyeung & Baron-17 
Cohen, 2012) to screen for suspected autism; where a cut-off score of seven was used to 18 
exclude participant data. In addition to the AQ-10, OA also completed a dementia screening 19 
using the Mini Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (M-ACE; Hsieh et al. 2014). 20 
Participants scoring 25 or less were excluded from the final sample.  21 
 22 
2.4 Procedure 23 
First, participants completed a short training session (detailed in SOM-R Supplement 3) 24 
followed by two 9-minute blocks of the ToM task, with a self-paced break between each. 25 
After completing the second block, participants completed the IRI followed by a 15-minute 26 
enforced break. Next, EF was evaluated using the CANTAB. The order of CANTAB testing was 27 
as follows: MOT, SST, AST, SWM and CRT. The SST, AST and CRT required the use of a 28 
left/right response button box, while the MOT and SWM were completed using the CANTAB 29 
touch screen. After a further 15-minute enforced break, participants completed block 3 and 30 
4 of the ToM task. Lastly, the AQ-10 was administered and then OA completed the M-ACE. 31 
The total duration of the session was approximately 3 hours, which allowed for numerous 32 




breaks. This time also permitted casual interaction and refreshments with participants to 1 
reduce fatigue and increase engagement (see SOM-R Supplement 4 for explicit tests 2 
showing no significant cross-group fatigue effects). 3 
 4 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 5 
All confirmatory analyses were conducted in SPSS (version 24) and JASP (version 0.12.2). The 6 
raw data, summary data and novel test materials used in this study can all be 7 
downloaded from https://osf.io/9zmx8/  8 
 9 
3. Results 10 
3.1 Sample characteristics  11 
OAs showed poorer performance across all neuropsychological measures. There was no 12 
statistically significant difference in self-reported perspective taking (PT) on the IRI (Table 2). 13 
Due to equipment failure, no CRT data were acquired for one OA. 14 
 15 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 16 
 17 
Table 2. 18 











Note. YA = Young Adults. OA = Older Adults. PT = Perspective Taking, self-report measure 30 
from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), max score 28 (higher score = higher 31 
perspective-taking proficiency). CANTAB measures: SST = Stop Signal Task, stop signal 32 
 Age Group   
 YA                  OA  
 M  SD M SD t 
IRI PT 18.66 4.49 18.40 4.79 .280 
SST 162.23 46.75 196.74 38.27      4.039*** 
AST 42.43 35.97 69.56 58.05    2.809** 
SWM 30.10 6.49 35.76 4.26       5.155*** 
CRT 303.89 52.02 369.36 52.55       6.229*** 




reaction time in ms. AST = Attention Switching Task, mean congruency cost; higher values 1 
indicate greater difficulty with managing attentional conflict. SWM = Spatial Working 2 
Memory, strategy score; higher scores represent poorer strategic performance. CRT = 3 
Choice Reaction Time, mean motor-response latency for correct responses in ms. Statistical 4 
significance based on independent t-tests comparing Age Group on each measure *p<.05.  5 
**p<.01. ***p<.001. 6 
 7 
3.2 Confirmatory ToM task analyses 8 
3.2.1 False belief task data pre-processing 9 
Prior to statistical analysis, the data were pre-processed as described in the study 10 
preregistration (see SOM-R Supplement 5, Table S2 for breakdown of trials removed). No 11 
participants scored below chance in the ‘filler’ trials (< 31 based on a binomial probability 12 
distribution, p < .05), indicating that all participants were attending to the task and could 13 
therefore be included in the subsequent analyses. Next, only the ToM trials (not the ‘filler’ 14 
trials), where a correct response was given, were analysed. Trials with a response latency of 15 
≤ 5ms were removed, which resulted in two trials being excluded (both from the 16 
KoR1OOC0SOC0 condition). Finally, RTs that were beyond 2 SDs from each participant’s 17 
condition mean were removed (322 for YAs, 309 for OAs; 631 in total). Then, trials with 18 
incorrect responses – including null responses – were removed (1065 trials; 7.4% of overall 19 
dataset) from the RT analysis and analysed separately, as the amount of errors per 20 
condition. Altogether, 1698 trials (11.8%) were removed prior to analysis; 404 for YAs and 21 
661 for OAs.  22 
 23 
3.2.2 False belief task RT and error-rate analyses 24 
Our primary hypotheses were tested using a series of factorial analyses conducted on the RT 25 
and accuracy data. The condition-mean RTs (Figure 2, Panel A) were entered into a four-way 26 
mixed ANOVAS1C with Age (young versus older) as a between-subjects factor, and three 27 
within-subjects factors: KoR ((reality unknown (KoR0) versus known (KoR1)); OOC ((agents’ 28 
beliefs congruent (OOC0) versus incongruent (OOC1)); SOC ((agent’s-participant’s beliefs 29 
congruent (SOC0) versus incongruent (SOC1)). Similarly, a four-way mixed ANOVA was 30 
conducted on the error-rate data (Figure 2, Panel B). To be consistent with our 31 
preregistered design and analysis protocol, we initially focus on the three repeated-32 




measures main effects (KoR, OOC, SOC), the interaction between KoR and SOC, and the 1 
relationship between Age Group and our primary within-subjects manipulations. However, 2 
all results are reported in Table 3. 3 
 4 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 5 
Figure 2. Panel A: Mean condition latencies separated by Group. Panel B: Mean percentage 6 
incorrect (accuracy) separated by Group. Error bars: +/- 2 SE. 7 
 8 




There was a statistically significant within-subjects (w/s) main effect of KoR in RT where, 1 
contrary to our preregistered hypothesis, KoR0 > KoR1 (RH1); participants were slower when 2 
they did not know the location of the ball, although there was no significant effect of KoR in 3 
accuracy. The w/s main effect of SOC was significant for RT and accuracy, where, in line with 4 
our registered hypothesis, participants were slower and made more errors when Self-Other 5 
perspectives where incongruent (SOC1) versus congruent (SOC0; RH2). The w/s main effect 6 
of OOC was also significant, where incongruence between Other-Other (OOC1) perspectives 7 
was associated with increased costs in RT and accuracy.  8 
Our hypothesis predicting a two-way interaction between SOC and KOR (RH3) was 9 
not supported - there was no significant increase in RT/inaccuracy when participants held 10 
explicit knowledge of reality (KoR1) and when their perspectives differed from the target 11 
agent's (SOC1) - a CofK as in the classic FB task. There was a significant interaction between 12 
KoR and SOC for accuracy when Self-Other knowledge states were incongruent (SOC1). A 13 
simple effects analysis showed that, unexpectedly, this effect occurred when the participant 14 
did not know where the ball was, indicating that participants made more mistakes 15 
specifically when reality was unknown (KOR0) and Self-Other beliefs differed (SOC1); 16 
however, note that this two-way interaction is qualified by a three-way interaction between 17 
KOR, SOC and Age Group in RT and accuracy, which does lend support to the CofK, albeit in 18 
a more complex way (see later results and Table 5). 19 
A between-subjects effect of Age Group indicated that OA were significantly slower 20 
and more error-prone than YA, as we predicted (RH5). We further expected an interaction 21 
between Age Group and each of the w/s factors, KoR, SOC and OOC (RH6). Contrary to our 22 
expectations; however, there were no statistically significant two-way interactions between 23 
KoR and Age Group in RT or error-rate, or between SOC and Age Group in RT. Nonetheless, 24 
there was an interaction between SOC and Age Group in accuracy, consistent with our 25 
preregistered hypothesis. As detailed in Table 3, simple effects analyses demonstrated that 26 
only OA made significantly more mistakes when their knowledge was incongruent (SOC1) 27 
versus congruent (SOC0) with the target agent and OA were significantly more error-prone 28 
than YA when Self-Other knowledge was incongruent (SOC1). 29 
There were also several interaction effects which we had not registered any 30 
predictions for and, as such, should be treated as exploratory; however, these are 31 
subsequently reported for transparency.  32 




There was a significant two-way interaction between KoR and OOC in RT. Simple 1 
effects analyses indicated that the effect of OOC was such that participants were 2 
consistently slower to respond when the two agents’ beliefs were incongruent (OOC1) 3 
versus congruent (OOC0), and manipulating KOR consistently resulted in slower responses 4 
when reality was unknown (KOR0) versus known (KOR1). Further, there was an advantage to 5 
RTs when the two agents’ beliefs were congruent (OOC0) and the ball’s location known 6 
(KOR1): when the two agents’ beliefs differed (OOC1), participants slowed significantly more 7 
for both reality unknown (KOR0) and known (KOR1). 8 
There was also a significant two-way interaction between SOC and OOC in RT. Here, 9 
the effect of congruency of Other-Other perspectives (OOC1 > OOC0) was only significant 10 
when Self-Other perspectives were congruent (SOC0). 11 
There was a three-way interaction between KOR, SOC and Age Group in RT and in 12 
accuracy. These interactions were interrogated using a further four, two-way repeated-13 
measures ANOVAs, one for each age group separated by RT and accuracy. For RT, as shown 14 
in Table 4, there was a significant interaction between KoR on SOC in YAs (F(1, 49) = 15.45, p 15 
< .001, ηp2= .240), but not OAs (F(1, 49) = .00, p = .949, ηp2= .000). For YAs, while always 16 
slower when Self-Other perspectives were incongruent (SOC1), the effect of KoR was larger 17 
when conflict between Self- and Other-perspectives was absent (SOC0) versus present 18 
(SOC1) and, again in YAs, the effect of SOC was larger when KoR was known (KOR1) versus 19 
unknown (KOR0). Contrary to the RT data, the two-way interaction in accuracy between KoR 20 
and SOC was non-significant in YAs (F(1, 49) = .04, p = .836, ηp2= .001) but significant in OAs 21 
(F(1, 49) = 9.07, p = .004, ηp2= .156). Table 5 shows that in OAs, there was no effect of SOC 22 
on accuracy when reality was known (KoR1). When reality was unknown (KoR0), incongruent 23 
perspectives between the participant and target agent (SOC1) caused OAs to become more 24 
error prone than when their perspectives were congruent (SOC0). There was also an effect 25 
of KoR when Self-Other perspectives were congruent (SOC0), where knowing about reality 26 
(KOR1) increased error-rate. Conversely, when Self-Other perspectives were incongruent 27 
(SOC1), not knowing about reality (KOR0) increased accuracy versus knowing (KoR1).  28 
 29 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 30 
 31 
Table 4. 32 




Pairwise comparisons of RT in YAs for KoR * SOC  
  ?̅?0 ?̅?1  ?̅? difference (0-1) SE Pbonf 
  SOC    
KoR0 735.451 809.320 -73.870 10.633 < .001*** 
KoR1 652.126 776.650 -124.524 9.758 < .001*** 
  KoR    
SOC0 735.451 652.126 83.325 11.786 < .001*** 
SOC1 809.320 776.650 32.670 7.987 < .001*** 
Note. *p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001.   
 1 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 2 
 3 
Table 5. 4 
Pairwise comparisons of percent incorrect in OAs for KoR * SOC  
  ?̅?0 ?̅?1 
 ?̅? difference (0-
1) 
SE Pbonf 
  SOC    
KoR0 6.279 12.946 -6.667 1.848 0.001*** 
KoR1 8.334 10.112 -1.77 1.512 .245 
  KoR    
SOC0 6.279 8.334 -2.055 0.839 0.018* 
SOC1 12.946 10.112 2.834 1.221 0.024* 
Note. *p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001.   
 5 
There was also a three-way interaction between Age, OOC and SOC in RT, (F(1, 98) = 6 
4.32, p = .040, ηp2 = .042). Two separate repeated-measures ANOVAs indicated the 7 
interaction between OOC and SOC was statistically significant in YA (F(1, 49) = 41.38, p < 8 
.001, ηp2= .458) but not OA (F(1, 49) = 1.95, p = .169). In both age groups, a conflicting 9 
(SOC1) versus a congruent Self-Other perspective (SOC0) resulted in slower RTs overall (SOC1 10 
> SOC0). Similarly, conflicting versus congruent perspectives between two agents also 11 
resulted in slower RTs in both groups (OOC1 > OOC0). YAs demonstrated a greater effect of 12 
SOC when the two agents’ perspectives were congruent (OOC0) versus incongruent (OOC1). 13 
Likewise, the congruency of the two agents’ perspectives had a much larger effect on RT 14 
when Self-Other perspectives were aligned (SOC0); Table 6. 15 
 16 




<TABLE 6 HERE> 1 
 2 
Table 6. 3 
Pairwise comparisons of RT in YAs for OOC * SOC  
  ?̅?0 ?̅?1  𝑋 difference (0-1) SE Pbonf 
  SOC    
OOC0 634.511 780.653 -146.142 13.104 < .001*** 
OOC1 753.066 805.317 -52.251 7.749 < .001*** 
  OOC    
SOC0 634.511 753.066 -118.550 14.802 < .001*** 
SOC1 780.653 805.317 -24.664 6.807 0.001*** 
Note. *p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001. 4 
 5 
Responding correctly in a FB paradigm might require a participant to shift attention 6 
between competing locations, for example, where the target object is located and where 7 
the target agent believes it is located. This is a typical feature of FB paradigms though, 8 
unlike incongruence between Self- and Other-perspectives, it is not an essential feature of 9 
FB problems. On this basis, for RH4, we hypothesised that there would be greater cognitive 10 
effort associated with holding in mind a competing Self-Other perspective (a FB, SOC1), 11 
versus managing alternate cued locations (OOC1). Assessing this required us to compare 12 
data from two pre-specified conditions within our ToM task: a classic FB condition, where 13 
two locations are cued – where the ball really is, and where the agent falsely believes the 14 
ball is – creating incongruence in Self-Other perspectives, and a condition like the original FB 15 
task where two competing locations are cued but, unlike the original FB, the target agent’s 16 
and participant’s beliefs are congruent. We illustrate these two conditions in Figure 3. In line 17 
with our predictions, a paired t-test revealed that a greater RT cost, around 32 ms, was 18 
observed when representing a FB (KoR1OOC0SOC1; ?̅? = 978.53 ms) – compared to conflict 19 
from managing alternate locations (KoR1OOC1SOC0; ?̅? = 946.88 ms), t(99) = 2.61, p = .010, d 20 
= .083. However, almost 5% more errors were made when managing alternate locations 21 
(KoR1OOC1SOC0; ?̅? = 9.72%) versus managing a FB (KoR1OOC0SOC1; ?̅? = 5.00%), t(99) = 4.23, 22 
p < .001, d = .415.  23 
 24 
<FIGURE 3 HERE> 25 






  3 
Figure 3. Panel A: Schematic illustration of the key events in a false belief trial 4 
(KoR1OOC0SOC1) and a conflicting Other-Other perspectives trial (KoR1OOC1SOC0; Panel B). 5 
Each trial exemplar in Panels A and B is indicative of the order of events for each of the two 6 
trial types. A typical event sequence might proceed as: 1. Cups shuffled. 2. Reality status of 7 
one cup is indicated. 3. Red agent indicates their belief status regarding one cup. 4. Blue 8 
agent indicates their belief status regarding one cup. 5. Target for participant representation 9 
is indicated as the blue agent. *Note that the order of presentation of event IDs 2, 3 and 4 10 
was counterbalanced and randomized across the full experiment. The grey shaded area 11 
highlights the critical components of a trial that are manipulated to generate either a false 12 
belief (panel A) or a conflicting Other-Other perspective (panel B). Panel C highlights which 13 
locations are cued in which aspect of the event sequence to illustrate the number of unique 14 
locations cued. 15 
 16 
3.3 Additional Exploratory Analyses 17 
3.3.1 Knowledge of Reality, FB reasoning and the ‘Curse of Knowledge’ (CofK) 18 
The three-way interaction between KOR, SOC and Age Group suggested that our initial 19 
interpretation of a CofK should be revised. When knowing the ball’s location, YA were 20 
slower to respond if the agent held a false-, (SOC1) rather than a true-belief (SOC0), which is 21 




consistent with a CofK. However, as shown in Table 4, YAs were slowest overall when 1 
reasoning about an agent with a FB when reality was unknown (KOR0). Moreover, OA 2 
showed the same pattern in the accuracy of their responses (Table 5); if they knew where 3 
the ball was, and the agent’s belief was false, they were more error-prone than if the 4 
agent’s belief was true, but OAs made the most errors when representing an agent who 5 
falsely believed the ball was at a location it was clearly not, which seems counterintuitive to 6 
the CofK hypothesis.  To further explore this, we theorised that belief representation in the 7 
reality unknown condition (KoR0) could pose additional difficulty because the empty 8 
location – the cup labelled with an X – should be avoided, which would require additional 9 
selection and control processes. Leslie and colleagues proposed that, in the classic object 10 
transfer FB task, it is implicit that the target agent wants to find the object (Leslie et al., 11 
2005). With the present task, regardless that the target agent had no awareness of the 12 
contents of any of the three locations – as in a typical FB task – here too it was implicit that 13 
the target agent would want to avoid the empty location. Knowing that the ball is not in a 14 
particular location bestowed the participant with privileged knowledge of where the ball 15 
definitely was not. With the current paradigm, we therefore effectively had two false belief 16 
conditions: the classic FB, as seen in the original object transfer task (KoR1OOC0SOC1), and a 17 
novel FB because the target agent thought that the ball was somewhere the participant 18 
knew for certain it was not (KoR0OOC0SOC1). Should the participant need to inhibit their 19 
knowledge of the location to be avoided, it would be reasonable to expect greater cognitive 20 
costs associated with the novel reality unknown FB (KoR0OOC0SOC1) versus the classic FB 21 
(KoR1OOC0SOC1) condition. To test this, two further paired t-tests were performed, taking 22 
the data from all participants. Our assertion was supported in RTs (classic FB ?̅? = 978.53 ms; 23 
novel FB ?̅? = 1033.99 ms;  ?̅? difference = 55.46 ms), t(99) = 5.20, p < .001, d = .141 and, 24 
though not statistically significant in accuracy, the direction was consistent with the RT data, 25 
ruling out a speed-accuracy trade-off (classic FB ?̅? = 5.00% errors; novel FB ?̅? = 6.45% 26 
errors;  ?̅? difference = 1.45%), t(99) = 1.83, p = .070. We propose that this pattern could be 27 
indicative of a cognitively effortful ‘double inhibition’ (Leslie, German and Pollizi, 2005). 28 
 29 
3.3.2 ToM, Ageing and EF 30 
Correlation analyses suggested that RTs in all conditions were significantly positively 31 
correlated with individual differences in two-choice motor-response time (CANTAB CRT; 32 




r=.619 to .682), inhibitory control (CANTAB SST; r=.354 to .395) and spatial working memory 1 
(CANTAB SWM; r=.325-.417). No RTs were significantly correlated with attentional capacity 2 
(CANTAB AST; r=.113 to .168) or self-reported ToM (IRI PT; r=-.067 to -.148). For error-rate, 3 
only motor-response time was significantly correlated with all conditions (CANTAB CRT; 4 
r=.243 to .434). All correlation coefficients are reported in SOM-R Supplement 6. 5 
To assess which aspects of EF explain the magnitude of conflict introduced within 6 
each experimental factor, we derived a ‘cost-factor’ (cf) for each of the three factors, KOR, 7 
OOC, and SOC. We collapsed across task conditions (KoR/SOC/OOC) and subtracted those 8 
conditions within each factor with pre-supposed high levels of conflict (KoR1/OOC1/SOC1) 9 
from those with lower levels of conflict (KoR0/OOC0/SOC0):  10 
 11 
KoRcf = (KoR1OOC0SOC0 + KoR1OOC1SOC0 + KoR1OOC0SOC1 + KoR1OOC1SOC1) – 12 
(KoR0OOC0SOC0 + KoR0OOC1SOC0 + KoR0OOC0SOC1 + KoR0OOC1SOC1) 13 
 14 
OOCcf = (KoR0OOC1SOC0 + KoR1OOC1SOC0 + KoR0OOC1SOC1 + KoR1OOC1SOC1) – 15 
(KoR0OOC0SOC0 + KoR1OOC0SOC0 + KoR0OOC0SOC1 + KoR1OOC0SOC1) 16 
 17 
SOCcf = (KoR0OOC0SOC1 + KoR1OOC0SOC1 + KoR0OOC1SOC1 + KoR1OOC1SOC1) – 18 
(KoR0OOC0SOC0 + KoR1OOC0SOC0 + KoR0OOC1SOC0 + KoR1OOC1SOC0)  19 
 20 
This was done separately for RT and for accuracy giving 6 CFs per participant. We ran six 21 
separate stepwise multiple regression analyses to predict each of the CFs. The data met the 22 
assumptions for multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and linearity, independence of errors 23 
(based on Durbin Watson ~2) and that the error terms were normally distributed. The OAs 24 
comprised more extreme CF values; however, all data were included: all participants had 25 
passed screenings for dementia and autism, all included ToM data had met performance 26 
criteria specified in the pre-registration, and the CF measures reflect a summary of an 27 
individual’s repeated, consistent behavioural performance over numerous trials. 28 
Consequently, we considered all CF values were representative of typical task performance 29 
within a continuum of variability. Each regression analysis included six predictors: Age 30 
Group, the self-reported perspective taking (PT) measure from the IRI, plus the four 31 




neuropsychological measures from the CANTAB, as reported in Table 2, SST, AST, SWM and 1 
CRT (Table 7).  2 
 3 




Table 7 shows that there were no significant predictors of KoRCF in either RT or accuracy. Consistent with the earlier analyses, Age Group was 3 
identified as a significant predictor of OOCcf RT, explaining 7% of the variation, where higher costs to RT were associated with lower age. 4 
Further, reduced self-reported ToM (IRI PT) and less efficient use of SWM explained around 10% of variation in OOCcf error-rate. 4% of the 5 
increased cost introduced to SOCcf RT was associated with greater difficulty managing attentional conflict (AST). Moreover, longer baseline RT 6 
(CRT) and poorer ToM proficiency could explain 14% of the increased error-rate introduced by varying Self-Other perspectives. 7 
8 
  
4. Discussion 1 
4.1 What factors affect variation in the difficulty of reasoning about the beliefs of others? 2 
(RQ1-4) 3 
We hypothesised that KoR could interfere with one’s ability to reason (RH1), due to bias 4 
towards own self-perspective – a CofK (Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007); however, this was not 5 
realised in the way predicted. Participants were faster when they knew reality. Compatible 6 
with our predictions (RH3), the effect of KoR was influenced by congruence of Self-Other 7 
perspectives. Incongruent Self-Other beliefs resulted in costs as predicted (RH2), and, as 8 
outlined in RH3, explicit KoR caused interference when representing incongruent Self-Other 9 
beliefs. Still, greater interference resulted from not knowing reality, particularly when the 10 
target agent held a FB.  11 
To explore the unexpected finding for KoR, we considered studies of belief-desire 12 
reasoning, where both the agent’s belief- (true/false) and desire-states (approach/avoid) 13 
are manipulated. Here, an agent’s desire-state is varied via a given preference to either seek 14 
out, or to avoid, a target object, for example (see Apperly et al., 2011; German and Hehman, 15 
2006; Hartwright et al., 2012; Leslie et al., 2005). This work shows that people exhibit 16 
increased difficulty processing false- versus true-beliefs and avoid- versus approach-desires, 17 
where a FB combined with an avoidance desire attracts maximal processing costs. Coupled 18 
with prior research showing that we anticipate others’ behaviour to fulfil, rather than 19 
conflict, their desires (Ferguson and Breheny, 2011), this suggests that it was implicit in our 20 
task that the agent wanted to avoid the empty location. Consequently, knowledge of the 21 
empty location, though undisclosed to the agent, reflects an avoidance desire, irrespective 22 
of that agent’s belief. This supposition implies that any condition highlighting an empty 23 
location would be effortful, and that mentalizing about an agent with a FB regarding the 24 
empty location would be doubly effortful: participants must inhibit their knowledge that the 25 
agent must avoid the location they (falsely) believe to be true. To test this, we compared 26 
data from a classic FB condition versus our novel, reality unknown FB condition. Exploratory 27 
analyses supported our assertion: participants took longer to resolve a reality unknown FB, 28 
which suggests that KoR itself is not the cause of the CofK. We propose that participants’ 29 
initial internal reference towards an agent’s desire can create conflict, in our case, resulting 30 
in re-direction away from the empty cup. This indicates that the salience of self-knowledge 31 
relates to the agent’s higher order intentions, which determines the CofK.  32 




 Additionally, we proposed that holding in mind a competing Self-Other perspective – 1 
a FB – would require greater effort than when shifting attention between competing 2 
locations (RH4); the latter a common, but not requisite, feature of FB problems. We 3 
compared two conditions where the number of locations cued was identical, but only one 4 
explicitly required representing a FB. Participants were slower but, contrary to our 5 
predictions, more accurate, when representing FBs versus managing competing locations. 6 
This suggests that representing a belief that differs from one’s own may recruit different 7 
processes to those for managing competing attentional cues, which may not be more 8 
effortful in itself. Indeed, the accuracy data suggest greater proficiency with inhibiting a 9 
conflicting self-perspective compared with inhibiting an irrelevant spatial cue.  This finding is 10 
consistent with neuroimaging data showing that representing a FB is functionally distinct 11 
from attentional demands due to cueing behaviourally relevant spatial locations (Mars et 12 
al., 2012; Scholz et al., 2009; Young, Dodell-Feder & Saxe, 2010). This supposition is further 13 
supported by differing predictors for SOC and OOC within our exploratory regression 14 
analyses, discussed shortly. 15 
 16 
4.2 Which cognitive components of belief-reasoning explain age-specific differences in 17 
ToM? (RQ5-6) 18 
We hypothesised that OAs would demonstrate poorer performance overall compared to 19 
YAs (RH5), and that each experimental factor would interact with age (RH6).  Consistent 20 
with German and Hehman (2006) and Hughes et al. (2019), OAs were generally slower and 21 
less accurate than YA. However, our data suggest that poorer performance in OA may be 22 
largely attributable to particular experimental features – specifically the need to switch 23 
attention between competing cued locations – which disproportionately impact OAs. OA 24 
suffered greater costs to both speed and accuracy than YA when managing conflicting cued 25 
locations (OOC). Age Group was the only significant predictor of the magnitude of cost to RT 26 
in OOC, whereas individual differences in spatial working memory and self-reported ToM 27 
proficiency predicted the cost to error-rate. Thus, while the cost of incongruent Other-Other 28 
perspectives to error-rate was best explained by how well participants could retain and 29 
manipulate visuospatial information, age was relevant to RT costs when managing 30 
competing locations. Conversely, both age groups’ RTs were similarly affected by 31 
manipulating SOC, our core ToM manipulation: they were comparably slower when 32 




representing an incongruent, rather than congruent, Self-Other perspective, although OA 1 
were more error-prone than YA specifically for conflicting Self-Other perspectives. Age 2 
group did not predict the magnitude of conflict elicited by varying congruence of 3 
perspectives in RT or accuracy. Instead, attentional capacity was most predictive of 4 
uncertainty introduced into RT, and Motor-response speed and self-reported ToM 5 
proficiency for the cost of incongruence to error-rate. These data suggest that individual 6 
differences in attentional capacity might best explain RT performance when managing 7 
competing Self-Other perspectives, and that errors may reflect limitations in EF and motor-8 
response speed rather than an age-related decline in ToM proficiency per se. Moreover, 9 
prior studies may inflate age-related changes in ToM capacity, due to incidental task 10 
demands which disadvantage OAs. 11 
 12 
5. Conclusion 13 
The present study suggests that FB reasoning is effortful for OA beyond the non-social 14 
cognitive demands of classic ToM investigations. Performance in each of our ToM scenarios 15 
paralleled individual differences in inhibitory control and spatial working memory. However, 16 
the magnitude of conflict experienced and the cognitive systems co-opted to resolve this 17 
were condition specific: managing competing cognitive perspectives was supported by 18 
attentional systems whereas invalid cueing appeared to draw on spatial working memory. 19 
Further, OA were particularly disadvantaged by invalid cueing. This indicates that prior 20 
studies may overestimate the effects of ageing on ToM and highlights the need for carefully 21 
managing attentional demands in future studies of ageing and ToM. 22 
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